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RIGHTS, REGULATIONS, AND REVOLVERS: BALTIMORE
CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGE
CITY'S
COMPLEX
FOLLOWING DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Uncertainty lurks around the comer. As another innocent youth is
lost due to a senseless act of gun violence, a West Baltimore
neighborhood mourns and vows that the latest victim will not die in
vain as another nondescript member of a growing tally. 1 The death of
Ronald Jackson, 14, who was shot and killed while attempting to
deliver two grapefruits to an elderly neighbor, serves as a chilling
reminder of the omnipresent threat of gun violence that afflicts
American cities. 2 Relatives believe an unfortunate case of mistaken
identity claimed the eighth grader's life-a heartrending situation of
a good deed met by violence. 3 The cold sidewalk bears a splotch of
dried blood which represents the only outward remnant of the
seemingly familiar tragedy that claimed a young, promising life. 4
Jackson was one of twenty-nine victims slain before their eighteenth
birthday and the fifth 14-year-old murdered in Baltimore in 2008. 5
The victims' names are often forgotten as another violent sequence
blurs each distinct episode that abruptly ends another life. 6 The
cumulative trauma, however, scars the outlook of those who bear
witness to the violence in their communities. 7 Fear has replaced
shock as the commonplace sentiment that reverberates after each
tragedy. 8 Although virtually desensitized by the violence, citizens

1.

2.
3.
4.

5.
6.

Peter Hermann, Another Innocent Victim of the Slaughter, Another Memory
Desecrated, BALT. SUN, Dec. 10,2008, at 6.
/d.
Gus G. Sentementes, A Good Deed Goes Bad, BALT. SUN, Dec. 9, 2008, at l.
/d.
Id.
See, e.g., Hermann, supra note 1 (noting that Ronald Jackson's death represents the
second shooting death of a youth at Tiffany Square, named after a six-year-old girl
who was struck in the head by a stray bullet fired during a shootout between rival drug
dealers in 1991).

7.
8.

See id.
Luke Broadwater & Kathleen Cullinan, Murder in the City: A Deadly January
Outrages Community, Frustrates Police, BALT. EXAMINER, Feb. 2, 2007, at 10.
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resolve to regain control of an evolving battleground and fight to
protect their most precious right-the right to life. 9
As uncertainty of the next deadly eruption of violence swells
throughout American cities, a recent Supreme Court of the United
States decision will likely generate a wave of Second Amendment
litigation, challenging the bedrock of cities' gun regulations. 10 In the
seminal case, District of Columbia v. Heller, 11 the majority of the
Court struck down Washington, D.C.'s total ban on handgun
possession in an individual's residence, which embodied one of the
strictest gun-control laws in the nation. 12 The Court also ruled that
the Second Amendment protects an individual's right to possess a
firearm detached from service in a militia and grants citizens the right
to utilize a firearm for self-defense purposes. 13 The majority
contended that the decision preserves the right of lawful defense of
self, family, and property in the place where citizens need it the
most-the home. 14
The dissent retorted that the Heller decision threatens to increase
the difficulties that local law enforcement already face in combating
handgun violence on the streets. 15 Although the federal regulatory
structure will likely remain largely intact, opponents argue that state
and local governments alike now face a quandary of defending
current gun regulations 16 while crafting future laws to conform to
Heller. 17 The cessation of innovative and progressive polices
designed to fight unlawful gun possession, due to forced conformity
to this recent decision, will almost certainly present significant issues
for state and local law enforcement, resulting in escalated crime. 18

9.
10.
11.
12.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See Hermann, supra note 1.
Linda Greenhouse, D.C. Ban Rejected: Landmark Decisions on Proper Meaning of
2nd Amendment, N.Y. TiMES, June 27,2008, at Al.
128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
See Adam Liptak, Carefully Plotted Course Propels Gun Case to Top, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 3, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007 /12/03/us/03bar.html?scp= 1&sq=care
fully<'/o20plotted%20course%20propels%20%20gun%20case%20to%20top&st=cse.
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2786.
See Greenhouse, supra note 10, at Al.
See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2868 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See infra Part V.
128 S. Ct. at 2821-22.
See Joan Biskupic & Kevin Johnson, Landmark Ruling Fires Challenges to Gun
Laws, USA TODAY, June 27,2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/Washington/200806-26-scotus-guns_N.htm. Washington, D.C. Mayor Adrian Fenty responded that the
Heller decision will have consequences for "'the entire country"' and that '"more
handguns in the District of Columbia will only lead to more handgun violence."" Jd
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Part II of this Comment will discuss the historical development of
gun regulation in the United States, commencing with the colonial
era. This section will expand upon the origins of the right to bear
arms principle and describe the Second Amendment's evolution from
an interest protected in state constitutions to a right enumerated in the
Bill of Rights. In Part III, this Comment will address the paucity of
Supreme Court case law on this subject and the Court's
underdeveloped interpretation of the Second Amendment throughout
American history. Part N will focus on the landmark Heller
decision. This section will discuss Justice Scalia's parsing of each
significant phrase of the Second Amendment and his general
interpretation of how each expression impacts an individual's right to
bear arms. In particular, this section will delineate the self-defense
ideal that the majority established. Also, this section will address the
dissent's three-part rebuttal to the majority's opinion.
Part V will explore the likelihood of a substantial wave of
contentious litigation concerning current codified gun regulation that
may threaten American cities. This section also addresses the grim
impact of gun violence in American cities and whether an increase in
gun possession as a consequence of Heller will engender further
crime. Finally, Part VI will glean how Baltimore City, a city riddled
with gun violence and a close neighbor of Washington, D.C., can
continue its commitment to reducing the volume of guns on the
streets while avoiding constitutional conflicts. This section also
offers several strategies that Baltimore City, along with other
American cities, can use to defeat challenges to current gun laws.
II.

THE SECOND AMENDMENT'S DEVELOPMENT DURING
THE PRE-CONSTITUTION ERA

The origins of the Second Amendment pre-date the Bill of Rights
and can be traced to at least the 1689 English Bill of Rights. 19 This
historical document provided English citizens the right to bear private
weapons for lawful purposes. 20 At common law during the colonial
19.

20.

See Thomas B. McAffee & Michael J. Quinlan, Bringing Forward the Right to Keep
and Bear Arms: Do Text, History, or Precedent Stand in the Way?, 75 N.C. L. REv.
781, 806 (1997) [hereinafter Bringing Forward the Right].
1 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 143 (St. George Tucker ed., 1803). Blackstone
explained that the purview of bearing arms under English common law included
citizens' "defence [sic] suitable to their condition and degree, and such as are allowed
by law. . . . [I]t is indeed, a public allowance under due restrictions, of the natural
right of resistance and self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are
found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression." ld.
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period, the colonists accepted the right to bear arms as a basic
freedom. 21 John Adams invoked this basic right when acting as lead
defense attorney for the British soldiers on trial for the Boston
Massacre. 22 Adams argued that "every private person is authorized to
arm himself, and on the strength of this authority, I do not deny the
inhabitants had a right to arm themselves at that time, for their
defence [sic], not for offence [sic]."23
The print media of the Revolutionary Era also captured the
ubiquitous sentiment that the colonists held in common the right to
keep arms in newspaper articles. 24 Boston's Journal of the Times
espoused this principal in a 1769 article in which the author referred
to the right to bear arms as "a natural right which the people have
reserved to themselves." 25
Although the founding generation
championed this natural right, the colonists had not memorialized this
protection or its capacity in a national binding document. 26 The
thirteen colonies operated a national government under the Articles
of Confederation, ratified in 1781, which omitted any mention of a
right to bear arms. 27 States' bills of rights drafted during this period
served as the only guarantee of colonists' basic rights. 28 As the
colonists defeated the British in organized militias during the
Revolutionary War, the right to bear arms and its scope as an
individual or collective right remained unclear. 29
After the founding generation won the Revolution, each colony met
at the constitutional convention in 1787 in Philadelphia to form a
permanent government. 30
Unrest reverberated throughout the
colonies as statesmen proposed a federal constitution without a bill of
rights. 31 During the New Hampshire Convention, it became the first
colony in which a majority voted to recommend a bill of rights when
21.
22.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

31.

See id.
John Adams, Adams' Argument for the Defense, in 3 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS
242, 248 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965).
!d. at 248.
See STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS: STATE AND FEDERAL BILLS OF
RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES 7 (2d ed. 1989).
!d.
See id.
David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies: Toward a Jurisprudence of the
Second Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 559, 594 (1986).
!d.
See John Adams, supra note 22, at 247-48.
See Stephen P. Halbrook, Rationing Firearms Purchases and the Right to Keep Arms:
Reflections on the Bills of Rights of Virginia, West Virginia, and the United States, 96
W.VA. L. REV. I, 13 (1993).
/d.
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it ratified the Constitution in 1788. 32 The recommended amendments
addressed the right to bear arms: "Congress shall never disarm any
citizen, unless such as are [sic] or have been in actual rebellion. " 33
The Virginia delegation joined as ardent supporters to draft a
protection of this right and warned of the tyranny that could
otherwise afflict the country. 34 George Mason typified this rallying
cry as he declared that "disarm[ing] the people ... was the best and
most effectual way to enslave them." 35
Motivated by the principle to "embody a present consensus of
opinion about the obvious rights of human beings," James Madison
sought to draft a collection of civil liberties that would protect the
colonists from tyranny. 36
Madison purchased a pamphlet
enumerating approximately two hundred state conventions' demands,
which he used to develop the Bill of Rights' framework that would
elicit the statehouses' approval. 37
The statesman especially
championed the ideal that the creation and preservation of a militia
represented the primary means of protection from foreign invasion. 38
To achieve the most effective phrasing of this right, Madison
consulted contemporary state constitutions and carefully studied their
language. 39 In particular, Madison closely modeled the prefatory
clause of the Second Amendment after the 1776 Virginia Declaration
of Rights. 40 The Second Amendment's thirteen-word preamble,

32.

33.
34.

35.

36.
37.

38.
39.
40.

See In Convention of the Delegates of the People of the State of New Hampshire
(June 21, 1788), in 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS: ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 326 (J.B. Lippincott ed., 1937) [hereinafter
THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS].
Id.
See The Debate Over the Constitution in Virginia 3 September 1787 - 31 March
1788, in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
xxxix, 3, 10 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1988).
The Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia, in THE DEBATES IN
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 32, at 380. Samuel Johnson similarly
defended the proposed federal constitution because he staunchly believed that "the
people are not to be disarmed of their weapons." Id. at 646.
Hardy, supra note 27, at 605.
Scott Bursor, Toward a Functional Framework for Interpreting the Second
Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1125, 1130 (1996) (citing 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 58 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1979)).
See id. at 1132; see also Stephen P. Halbrook, To Keep and Bear Their Private Arms:
The Adoption of the Second Amendment, 1787-1791, 10 N. KY. L. REv. 13, 16 (1982).
See N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. Il-a; N.C. CaNST. art. I,§ 30; R.I. CONST. art. I,§ 22; VA.
CONST. art. I,§ 13.
See VA. CaNST. art. I, § 13. The particular language reads:
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which reads, "[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State," has sparked a constitutional conundrum
related to whether this clause preserves a military means to defend
the free state from foreign invasion or forges a natural right of man to
own firearms for self-defense to preserve civil order. 41
The Second Amendment's prefatory clause has created a plethora
of debate, and some argue that its unique diction should engender a
different interpretation than other constitutional provisions. 42
Scholars have noted that "[w]hat is special about the Amendment is
the inclusion of an opening clause ... [n]o similar clause is a part of
any other Amendment."43 Scholars have posited numerous theories
about the Framers' intention, including the interpretation that the
justification clause places a condition on the operative clause. 44 This
group contends that the right to bear arms is activated only when this
action contributes to a well-regulated militia and belongs solely to
state governments to maintain a military force. 45 Others argue that
Madison drafted this clause to offer justification for his command,
and not to limit its scope to participation in militia activities. 46 This
group recognizes the right of all citizens to keep and bear arms for all
lawful purposes. 47 Before Heller, this divisive topic had remained
largely unresolved for the better part of two centuries, both sides
staunchly defending their interpretation of the Second Amendment. 48

That a well regulated militia, composed of the body of the
people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defense of
a free state, therefore, the right of the people to keep and bear
arms shall not be infringed; that standing armies, in time of peace,
should be avoided as dangerous to liberty; and that in all cases the
military should be under strict subordination to, and governed by,
the civil power.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

!d.
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
See Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 793,
793-94 ( 1998).
Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 644
(1989).
See Volokh, supra note 42, at 801. The operative clause reads, "the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." /d. at 794.
See David E. Vandercoy, The History of the Second Amendment, 28 VAL. U. L. REV.
1007, 1008 (1994).
See Volokh, supra note 42, at 802-04.
See Vandercoy, supra note 45, at 1038.
/d. at 1024-25.
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III. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF SECOND
AMENDMENT INTERPRETATION
Until the Heller decision, the Second Amendment had been a
dormant topic on the Supreme Court's docket for nearly seventy
years and ·traditionally represented an underdeveloped area of the
law. 49 The Court's initial opinions on the Second Amendment date to
the nineteenth century when the Court exercised the nonincorporation doctrine to find that the Bill of Rights did not apply to
the states, but only to the federal government. 50
A.

The Supreme Court Declines to Incorporate the Second
Amendment in United States v. Cruikshank51

The Supreme Court adopted the non-incorporation ideal in
Cruikshank where it held that the Second Amendment only
guarantees a citizen's right to bear arms against Congressional
interference. 52 In Cruikshank, three defendants had been convicted
under the Enforcement Act of 1870 for conspiring to "hinder and
prevent" two African-Americans from exercising their First
Amendment right of peaceful assembly and their Second Amendment
right to keep and bear arms. 53 Congress had enacted the Enforcement
Act to protect the constitutional rights of southern blacks following
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment as part of the Civil War
Reconstruction. 54 In overturning the convictions, the Court declared
that the Second Amendment was not intended to limit the powers of
the state governments with respect to their own citizens. 55 An
49.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Anthony J. Dennis, Clearing the Smoke From the Right to Bear Arms and the Second
Amendment, 29 AKRON L. REv. 57, 87 (1995). The Supreme Court indirectly
addressed the federal judiciary's interpretation of a citizen's basic rights guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 416-17 (1856). The
Supreme Court ruled that it would "give to persons of the negro race, who were
recognized as citizens in any one State of the Union, the right ... to keep and carry
arms wherever they went." ld at 417. This statement provides evidence that Chief
Justice Taney supported the view that the Second Amendment protected an individual
right to bear arms and not a collective right associated with service in a state militia.
See id_.
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 173 (1986) (citing Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833)).
92 U.S. 542 (1875).
ld at 542 (holding that the Second Amendment "has no other effect than to restrict the
powers of the national government.").
Id at 543.
See id. at 546-47.
Id at 547.
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important historical facet of this case is that its record is devoid of
any indication that the two defendants had any affiliation with a
militia. 56 Moreover, there is not a single militia reference in the
Court's opinion. 57 "If the purpose of the Second Amendment was to
confer a 'collective right' on states to maintain militias, the Court
could have simply rejected any claim to an individual right in the
Second Amendment on those grounds. " 58 Instead the Court ruled that
the Second Amendment "has no other effect than to restrict the
powers of the national government," and left unresolved the question
of the Amendment's scope. 59
The Supreme Court affirmed this decision in Presser v. Illinois, 60
upholding the conviction of the defendant who unlawfully led over
four-hundred armed members of a paramilitary organization down
the streets of Chicago "without having a license from the governor,
[with arms not part of] ... 'the regular organized volunteer militia' of
the state of Illinois, or the troops of the United States." 61 In striking
down the defendant's contention that the Illinois law violated his
right to bear arms, the Court declared that the Second Amendment
does not prohibit this legislation because it places "a limitation only
upon the power of [C]ongress and the national government, and not
upon that of the state." 62 Although significant portions of Cruikshank
and Presser have been overturned by later decisions, these decisions
remain valid authority on whether the Second Amendment applies to
the states through Fourteenth Amendment incorporation. 63 These
decisions also represent the only significant Supreme Court
interpretations of the Second Amendment until the murky United
States v. Miller64 decision. 65
56.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

62.

63.
64.
65.

Michael J. Quinlan, Is There a Neutral Justification for RefUsing to Implement the
Second Amendment or Is the Supreme Court Just "Gun Shy"?, 22 CAP. U. L. REv.
641, 666 (1993).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 665 (quoting Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553).
116 u.s. 252 (1886)
Jd. at 254, 265 ("The [S]econd [A]mendment declares that [the right to bear arms]
shall not be infringed, but this ... means no more than that it shall not be infringed by
[C]ongress. This is one of the amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the
powers of the national government .... ").
Id. at 265. The Court again refused to address the Second Amendment's scope and
instead solely referred to the non-incorporation principle to decide the right to bear
arms issue. See id.
William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43
DUKE L.J. 1236, 1239 n.IO (1994).
307 U.S. 174 (1939).
See Van Alstyne, supra note 63, at 1239 n.IO.
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United States v. Miller: The Supreme Court Rejects an
Opportunity to Examine the Precise Purview of the Substantive
Right Protected by the Second Amendment

In Miller, the Court rejected a Second Amendment challenge to a
federal statute, which banned sawed-off shotguns and submachine
guns. 66 Two defendants were arrested for transporting an unlicensed
short-barreled shotgun across state lines in violation of the National
Firearms Act of 1934, which regulated the transfer of firearms and
imposed a tax upon such activity. 67 At trial, the defendants argued
that the National Firearms Act violated the Second Amendment
because it restricted the individual possession of arms and contended
that "[t]he National Firearms Act is not a revenue measure but an
attempt to usurp police power reserved to the States, and is therefore
unconstitutional. " 68 The trial court agreed, ruling that the National
Firearms Act violated the Second Amendment's prohibition of
federal infringement of the right to bear arms. 69 However, the case
was appealed to the Supreme Court where neither the defendants nor
their legal counsel appeared before the Court. 70 In interpreting and
applying the Second Amendment, the Court analyzed the statute's
purpose and weighed the means that would render possible the
greatest effectiveness of the militia. 71 On May 15, 1939, the Court
declared that no constitutional conflict existed between the Second
Amendment and the federal statute. 72 The Court ruled:
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that
possession or use of a 'shotgun having a barrel less than
eighteen inches in length' at this time has some reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well
regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second

66.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Miller, 307 U.S. at 178-79 (holding that the Colonies' history, debates at
Constitutional Conventions, and the writings of approved commentators have
consistently defined the term "militia" to include all males physically capable of
acting in concert for the common defense).
/d. at 175.
/d. at 176. The defendants further argued that "[t]he National Firearms Act ...
offends the inhibition of the Second Amendment to the Constitution." /d.
/d.at177.
!d. at 175, 177.
!d. at 178.
See id. at 183.
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Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an
instrument. 73
Although the Court's decision appears to support a collective rights
interpretation of the Second Amendment, the Court never defined the
Second Amendment's scope because it remanded the case to the
federal district court "for further proceedings" which never
transpired. 74 Miller's uncertain and ambiguous conclusion sparked
vehement constitutional debate. 75
Miller was and continues to remain a focal point of Second
Amendment debate as both gun control opponents and advocates cite
this significant case to bolster their arguments. 76 Gun control
opponents claim that this decision merely ruled that a sawed-off
shotgun was not a military weapon and an individual maintains the
right to bear arms of "ordinary military equipment.'m Furthermore,
they condemn the Court's decision on faulty rationale because the
judges failed to recognize that American soldiers commonly used
short-barreled shotguns in World War I and point out that neither the
defendants, nor their counsel, had an opportunity to present this
argument before the Court. 78 In addition, gun control opponents
argue that when the state called men for militia service, the individual
was expected to appear bearing his own arms. 79
Conversely, gun control advocates contend that Miller further
clarified that the Second Amendment protects the rights of states to
maintain militias and the rights of citizens to serve as militia
members. 80 They emphasize that the decision focused on the type of
militia arms that were constitutionally protected. 81 In addition, gun
control advocates contend that the federal circuit courts have cited the
Miller precedent for over six decades while dismissing legal
challenges to federal firearm regulations. 82 In 2008, in Heller, the
73.
74.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

/d. at 178.
/d. at 183. The further proceedings never took place because at the time of the
Supreme Court's decision, Miller had died and the other defendant struck a plea
bargain after the Court rendered its decision. See Brian L. Frye, The Peculiar Story of
United States v. Miller, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 48, 68--69 (2008).
See Dennis, supra note 49, at 90.
/d.
Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Secof}d
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REv. 204, 248 (1983) (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 178).
/d.
.
See Dennis, supra note 49, at 82.
/d. at 90.
/d.
See Kates, supra note 77, at 248, 250.
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Supreme Court addressed the specific scope of the Second
Amendment and clarified the judiciary's interpretation of Miller. 83
IV. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V HELLER'S PRECEDENT: AN
INDIVDUAL RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE
In the landmark case District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme
Court sought to clarify the scope of the Second Amendment. 84 In
particular, the Court addressed whether a Washington, D.C. resident
had a constitutional right to possess a loaded handgun at home for the
purpose of self-defense. 85 The Court emphatically ruled that the
Second Amendment protects an individual's right to own a gun for
personal use. 86
Dick Heller, a Washington, D.C. special police officer, filed a
lawsuit in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia
seeking to enjoin the city from enforcing its law that banned the
registration of handguns on Second Amendment grounds. 87 The
plaintiff also challenged the city's licensing requirement, which
prohibited the possession of a firearm in the home without a license,
and the trigger-lock requirement which barred the use of "functional
firearms [with]in the home." 88 The district court dismissed Heller's
complaint, 89 but the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed this decision and directed the district court to enter
summary judgment for the plaintiff. 90 The District of Columbia
83.

84.
85.
86.
87.

88.

89.
90.

District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2814 (2008) ("Miller stands only for
the proposition that the Second Amendment right ... extends only to certain types of
weapons. It is particularly wrongheaded to read Miller for more than what it said,
because the case did not even purport to be a thorough examination of the Second
Amendment.").
See id. at 2787-88.
!d. at 2788.
!d. at 2818.
/d. at 2788. The District of Columbia made it a crime to carry an unregistered firearm
and also prohibited the registration of handguns within city limits. See D.C. CoDE§§
7-2501.01(12), 7-2502.01(a), 7-2502.02(a)(4) (2001).
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2785. The District of Columbia criminalized handgun possession
without a license, but the chief of police could issue licenses for one-year periods.
See D.C. CODE §§ 22-4504(a), 22-4506. In addition, the District of Columbia
required residents to secure their lawfully registered firearms, such as long guns,
"unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device" unless the
firearms were "kept at [the owner's] place of business" or the owner was using the
firearm for a "lawful recreational purpose." See id. § 7-2507.02.
See Parker v. District ofColumbia, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103, 109 (D.C. Cir. 2004), rev'd,
478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370,401 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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petitioned the Supreme Court to hear the case, and after granting a
writ of certiorari, 91 the Court held that the city's total ban on
handguns violated Heller's right because the Second Amendment
protects an individual's right to possess firearms. 92 In addition, the
Court struck down the District of Columbia's law requiring citizens
to keep firearms neutralized even when necessary for self-defense. 93
For the Supreme Court, Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the
majority opinion, which represented his most important decision in
his twenty-two years on the Court. 94 Justice Scalia trumpeted the
majority's view clearly that, "it is not the role of this Court to
pronounce the Second Amendment extinct."95
Justice Scalia
carefully countered each argument offered by Justice Stevens's
dissent96 as both sides analyzed the history and text of the Second
Amendment. 97 Justice Scalia commenced his analysis of the meaning
of the Second Amendment by dissecting each clause and defining its
collection of terms. 98
A.

Unlocking the Meaning of the Second Amendment's
Operative Clause

Justice Scalia first employs an intratextualism approach to examine
the Second Amendment's operative clause to demonstrate that the
right to bear arms is an individual right. 99 Justice Scalia declares that
the phrase "right of the people" in the Second Amendment should not
be viewed in isolation from other similar clauses in the Constitution
because the intended interpretation of the Founding Fathers' larger

91.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

97.
98.
99.

District of Columbia v. Heller, 552 U.S. 1035, 1035 (2008) ("[The p]etition for a writ
of certiorari [is] ... granted limited to the following question: Whether the following
provisions-D.C. CODE §§ 7-2502.02(a)(4), 22-4504(a), and 7-2507.02-violate the
Second Amendment rights of individuals who are not affiliated with any stateregulated militia, but who wish to keep firearms for private use in their homes?").
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783,2821-22 (2008).
Id.
See Greenhouse, supra note 10, at Al.
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2822.
See id. at 2869 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The majority spends the first 54 pages of its
opinion attempting to rebut Justice Stevens' evidence that the Amendment was
enacted with a purely militia-related purpose.").
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788-92.
See id. at 2790. Justice Scalia's approach typifies a classic example of an
intratextualist who reads "a word or phrase in a given clause by self-consciously
comparing and contrasting it to identical or similar words or phrases elsewhere in the
Constitution." Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REv. 747, 748
(1999).
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pattern of meaning would be lost. 100 Justice Scalia notes that the
phrase "right of the people" appears throughout the Constitution,
specifically in both the First Amendment's Assembly-and-Petition
clause and in the Fourth Amendment's Search-and-Seizure clause,
which refer to individual rights. 101 The majority emphasizes that
these parallel constitutional references are distinct from the
requirement to exercise the respective right through participation in a
collective organization; consequently, an interpretation of the Second
should conform to this standard meaning of the phrase, as a right held
by the individual. 102
The majority opinion then transitions its focus from the possessor
of the right, to the substance of the right. 103 Justice Scalia defines the
phrase "keep and bear Arms" as the right to use all devices that
"constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the
time of the founding." 104 Justice Scalia defends the notion that
"Arms" not only has the limited scope of weapons in existence
during the creation of the Bill of Rights, but it also includes modem
instruments. 105 He analogizes that the First Amendment similarly
shelters "modem forms of communications" and not simply the
limited media found in the colonial era. 106
Justice Scalia further argues that state constitutions
contemporaneous with the signing of the Bill of Rights referred to a
self-defense principle when referencing the right to bear arms, which
corroborates the majority's Second Amendment interpretation. 107
The majority cites nine eighteenth and nineteenth century state
constitutional provisions, which granted, "the people have a right to
bear arms for the defence [sic] of themselves and the state." 108

100. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2790.
101. !d.
102. See id. at 2788-91 (arguing that the phrase "right of the people" creates "a strong
presumption that the Second Amendment right is exercised individually and belongs
to all Americans").
103. !d. at2791.
104. !d. at 2791-92.
105. !d.
I 06. !d. Justice Scalia further defines the phrase "bear arms" as having the natural
connotation to "have weapons," which supports the idea that citizens have a basic
right to own firearms for self-defense. !d. at 2792.
107. !d. at 2793-94.
I 08. !d. (indicating that the following 18th and 19th century state constitutions contained
the above-referenced phrase: PA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § XIII (1776); VT.
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § XV (1777); KY. CONST. art. XII, cl. 23 (1792); OHIO
CONST. art. VIII,§ 20 (1802); IND. CONST. art. I,§ 20 (1816); MISS. CONST. art. I,§ 23
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Justice Scalia counters the dissent's argument that "bear Arms" had
an idiomatic meaning during the Founders' generation "to serve as a
soldier, do military service, fight or to wage war" by noting that this
meaning only applied when followed by the preposition
'"against. "' 109 Justice Scalia notes that the dissent's "bear Arms"
definition, "[h]e has constrained our fellow Citizens taken Captive on
the high Seas to bear Arms against their Country," applied to the
Declaration of Independence, but not to the general Second
Amendment interpretation. 110 Supported by this evidence, the
majority concludes that the operative clause of the Second
Amendment "codified a pre-existing right" that guarantees an
individual right to carry a weapon for the purpose of securing one's
defense. 111 Following this conclusion, the majority proceeds to
dissect the prefatory clause and addresses whether the Second
Amendment's preamble conforms to its interpretation of the
operative clause. 112
B.

The Legal Interpretation of the Prefatory Clause and Its
Enigmatic Phraseology

The majority argues that the prefatory clause merely announces the
significant purpose of preserving an individual right to bear arms and
does not define the outside scope of the right. 113 To substantiate this
contention, the majority opinion defines "'[w]ell-[r]egulated Militia"'
in the prefatory clause as "'all males physically capable of acting in
concert for the common defense."' 114 This definition comports with
the Federalist Papers and news articles from the Revolutionary War
Era which use the term "militia" to describe the general free male
populace of the colonies, all of whom were able to bear arms and
resist the British government. 115 Justice Scalia notes that the
"[p]etitioners take a seemingly narrower view of the militia, stating
that '[m]ilitias are the state- and congressionally-regulated military
forces described in the Militia Clauses"' in the Constitution. 116 The
Militia Clause authorizes Congress:

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

(1817); CONN.CONST. art. I,§ 17 (1818); ALA.CONST. art. I,§ 23 (1819); Mo.CONST.
art. XIII,§ 3 (1820)).
See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2830.
I d. at 2794 (emphasis added).
Jd. at 2797.
See generally id. at 2797-800.
Id. at 2789-90.
Jd. at 2799 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1930)).
See id.
ld. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cls. 15-16).
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To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the
Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be
employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to
the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and
the Authority of training the Militia according to the
discipline prescribed by Congress. 117
Justice Scalia acknowledges that "militia" holds the same meaning in
both Article I and the Second Amendment, but he contends that the
petitioners "identify the wrong thing, namely, the organized
militia." 118 Congress has the power to raise armies and navies, but
Article I presumes that a militia is already in existence because
"Congress is given the power to 'provide for calling forth the militia'
and the power not to create, but to [merely] 'organiz[e]."' 119 Thus,
Congress has the power to organize the units that comprise an
effective force, but it need not conscript every able-bodied man into
the militia "because nothing in Article I suggests that in exercising its
power to organize, discipline, and arm the militia, Congress must
focus upon the entire body." 120 Justice Scalia concludes that
"[a]lthough the militia consists of all able-bodied men, the federally
organized militia may consist of a[ny] subset of them," thus
conferring an individual right to bear arms to those not in the
organized militia. 121
Finally, Justice Scalia notes that this
interpretation conforms to the Court's ruling in Miller and to the
rulings of other state courts. 122
Justice Scalia then turns to the final prefatory phrase "security of a
free state" and concludes that the drafting history of the Second
Amendment and the Framers' intention demonstrate that this phrase
references the entire country and does not address each individual

117.
118.
119.
120.

U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 16.
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2799-800.
/d. at 2800 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 15).
/d. Congress exercised this right in the first Militia Act, which specified that "each
and every free able-bodied white male citizen of the respective states, resident therein,
who is or shall be of the age of eighteen years, and under the age offorty-five years ..
. shall severally and respectively be enrolled in the militia." Act of May 8, 1792, ch.
33, 1 Stat. 271.
121. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2800.
122. /d. at 2800, 2809; see also Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846) ("The right of the
whole people, old and young, men, women and boys, and not militia only, to keep and
bear arms of every description, and not such merely as are used by the militia, shall
not be infringed, curtailed, or broken in upon ....").
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states' security. 123 The majority argues that although the term "State"
refers to individual states in a few instances in the Constitution, the
Framers intended this word to have multiple meanings depending on
the particular context. 124 Justice Scalia illustrates once again through
an intratextualism approach that in other sections of the Constitution,
the Framers included modifiers to the term "State" to emphasize a
reference to the several states. 125 For instance, these references
include the phrase "each state" or "any state" to denote that a
particular provision was applicable to an individual state. 126 Justice
Scalia notes, however, that in this instance, the word "state" is not
accompanied by a similar modifier; consequently, the Second
Amendment's underlying purpose is for able-bodied men to possess
firearms to repel tyranny and not for the protection of the state via a
militia. 127
C.

Piecing the Puzzle Together: The Constitutional Guarantee of an
Individual Right to Bear Arms

The final stage of the majority's dissection of the Second
Amendment's language examines the relationship between the
operative and prefatory clauses. 128 Justice Scalia declares that the
prefatory clause definitively "announces the purpose for which the
right was codified: to prevent elimination of the militia" while also
preserving the accompanying purposes of self-defense and hunting. 129
He contends that this phrase explicitly protects an individual's right
to form a "citizens' militia" over which Congress has no power or
authority to regulate membership. 130 As further evidence, the
majority asserts that the contemporaneous state constitutions of
Pennsylvania and Vermont, which contain similar language to the
Second Amendment, embrace an individual right to bear arms
divorced from militia service; therefore, the Court cannot accept the
Second Amendment as an outlier, protecting a right unknown in state

123.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

130.

Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2800 (citing 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 208 (Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833)) ("[T]he
word 'state' is used in various senses [and in] its most enlarged sense, it means the
people composing a particular nation or community.").
/d.
See id.
/d.
/d. at 2800-01.
See id. at 2801-05.
!d. at 280 I.
/d.
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constitutions or at English common law. 131 The majority concludes
that the prefatory clause "fits perfectly" with the operative clause as
the Framers knew that tyrants historically secured power "not by
banning the militia but simply by taking away the people's arms,
enabling a select militia or standing army to suppress political
opponents." 132
D.

The Second Amendment Is Not an Absolute Right: Certain Gun
Regulations Preserved By Heller

Although the Heller ruling expanded the Second Amendment's
scope to permit an individual's use of firearms, the majority made
clear that this right is not an absolute right, but remains subject to
regulation. 133 Justice Scalia states, "[l]ike most rights, the right
secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited . . . . the right
was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any
manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose." 134 Cognizant of the
potential dangers of unfettered gun ownership, the Court remains
resolute in restricting gun ownership by felons. 135 The Court's
decision extends the right to law-abiding and "responsible citizens to
use arms in defense of hearth and home." 136 In addition, gun
regulations will persist to restrict the mentally ill from possessing
firearms and criminalize the act of individuals "carrying ... firearms
in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings." 137
Finally, the majority categorically recognizes that the Second
Amendment does not protect the individual use of "dangerous and

131.

132.
133.
134.

135.
136.
137.

See Volokh, supra note 42, at 795. Similar language in the state constitution of
Pennsylvania states, "the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of
themselves and the state." See PA. CoNST. OF 1776, Declaration of Rights, cl. 13
(1873); see also VT. CONST. OF 1777, Declaration of Rights, ch. 1, art. XV (1793).
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2801.
/d. at2816-17.
!d. (citing several nineteenth century cases and commentaries that have historically
held that the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited: State v.
Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 490 (1850); United States v. Sheldon, in 5 TRANSACTIONS
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 337, 346 (W. Blume ed.,
1940); WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 122-23 (1825)).
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816-17.
!d. at 2821.
/d.at2816-17.
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unusual weapons." 138 The Court defers to Miller, the controlling
precedent on this particular issue, which explained that the types of
weapons protected are those '"in common use at the time. "' 139 The
conception of the militia during the era of the Second Amendment's
ratification included all citizens capable of military service, who
would bring the type of lawful weapons that they possessed at home
to militia duty. 140 Unwilling to deviate from precedent, the Court
refuses to lift its restrictions on non-traditional firearms. 141
E.

The Dissent Cites Precedent to Discredit the Majority's
Second Amendment Interpretation

In his dissent, Justice Stevens counters that the Second
Amendment's text and relevant history, among other factors,
forecloses any valid interpretation that grants an individual the right
Justice Stevens
to bear arms for personal self-defense. 142
characterizes the majority's Second Amendment analysis as "a
strained and unpersuasive reading of the ... text" that recklessly
overturns longstanding precedent, and offers three main arguments to
discredit the majority's erroneous ruling. 143
1.

The Founding Fathers' Purposeful Omission of an Express
Grant for an Individual Right to Bear Arms

Justice Stevens asserts that the absence of specific allusions to the
self-defense principle in the drafting of the Second Amendment is a
conspicuous omission, considering that the presence of this specific
reference appears in numerous state constitutions. 144 The dissent
specifically notes that the Pennsylvania and Vermont Declarations of
Rights explicitly provide a statement of purpose in their preamble
related to the right to use firearms for self-defense. 145 Justice Stevens
138.

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

I d. at 2817 (refusing to announce a list of weapons that fit the category of "dangerous
and unusual weapons" but explaining that any sophisticated arms that are highly
unusual in society at large, such as M-16 rifles, are prohibited).
Jd. (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)).
Jd.
/d. at 2815-17.
See id. at 2822 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Jd. at 2822-24.
Jd. at 2825.
Jd. at 2825-26. Article XIII of Pennsylvania's 1776 Declaration of Rights announced,
"[t]hat the people have a right to bear arms for the defence [sic] of themselves and the
state." See 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
215, 266 (1971) (emphasis added). Likewise, Article XV of the 1777 Vermont
Declaration of Rights guaranteed, "[t]hat the people have a right to bear arms for the
defence [sic] of themselves and the State." See id. at 319, 324 (emphasis added).
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argues that "[t]he contrast between those two declarations and the
Second Amendment reinforces the clear statement of purpose
announced in the Amendment's preamble." 146 The dissent argues that
this purposeful exclusion in the Second Amendment's verbiage of
any individual right protection confirms the Founding Father's
single-minded focus in creating a constitutional guarantee "to keep
and bear arms" for military uses of firearms only. 147
2.

The Second Amendment's "Militia" Preamble Encompasses Its
Sole Purpose: The Right to Bear Anns Is a Collective Right
Exercised in Militia Service Only

The dissent contends that the Second Amendment's prefatory
clause establishes the object of the Amendment and the meaning of
the remainder of its text. 148 Justice Stevens attacks the majority's
denigration of the prefatory clause's significance by discrediting the
majority's interpretative process. 149 In particular, the majority begins
analyzing the Amendment's operative provision and then returns to
the preamble merely to ensure that its "reading of the operative
clause is consistent with the announced purpose." 150 Justice Stevens
argues that this method deviates from how the Court ordinarily reads
texts and distorts how the Framers' viewed the prefatory clause upon
the Second Amendment's adoption. 151 The dissent makes clear that
"[w]hen each word in the text is given full effect, the Amendment is
most naturally read to secure to the people a right to use and possess
arms in conjunction with service in a well-regulated militia." 152 The
dissent argues that any group that advocates a departure from the
well-established interpretation of the Second Amendment's purpose
identified in the prefatory clause must meet a strict burden. 153 Justice
Stevens notes that the textual analysis embraced by the Court
unequivocally "falls far short of sustaining that heavy burden." 154

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2826 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
/d.
/d.

/d.
/d.
!d. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803)). Justice Stevens discredits
the majority's contention that the prefatory clause's language is merely superfluous
because '"[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the Constitution is intended to be
without effect."' See id. (alteration in original).
152. /d. at 2831.
153. !d.
154. /d.
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Every Lower Court Has Cited the Second Amendment's
Collective Right Interpretation Under United States v. Miller

Finally, the dissent criticizes the Court for failing to distinguish
Miller and for placing more emphasis on the judiciary's "decisional
process" than on the precedent's reasoning. 155 Justice Stevens
identifies numerous lower court cases where judges followed the
precedent established in Miller to find that the Second Amendment
does not protect the individual right to possess and use firearms for
purely private purposes. 156 Justice Stevens highlights, in particular,
Lewis v. United States, 157 whereby the Supreme Court affirmed the
Miller precedent in 1980. 158 Justice Stevens states, "[ n]o new
evidence has surfaced since 1980 supporting the view that the
Amendment was intended to curtail the power of Congress to
regulate civilian use or misuse of weapons." 159 The dissent argues
that the majority failed to give proper deference to the wellestablished views of their predecessors and to the law itself. 160
Justice Stevens references Justice Cardozo who trumpets the Court's
traditionalist view that the "'labor of judges would be increased
almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened
in every case, and one could not lay one's own course of bricks on
the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone
before him. "' 161 For these reasons, the dissent argues that the wellestablished precedent "would prevent most jurists from endorsing
such a dramatic upheaval in the law." 162
The dissent also criticizes the majority's failure to follow the
Framers' chief policy position developed over two hundred years
155. /d. at 2824.
156. See id. at 2823 n.2 (indicating that other than a recent Fifth Circuit decision, every
federal court of appeals to consider the question had interpreted Miller to endorse a
"collective rights" interpretation of the Second Amendment). See, e.g., United States
v. Haney, 264 F.3d 1161, 1164-66 (lOth Cir. 2001); United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d
394, 402-04 (6th Cir. 2000); Gillespie v. Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 710-11 (7th Cir.
1999), abrogated by 587 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d
1265, 1271-74 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 285-86 (3d
Cir. 1996); Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98, 100-03 (9th Cir. 1996), abrogated by 563
F.3d 439 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1018-20 (8th Cir.
1992).
157. 445 U.S. 55 (1980).
158. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2823 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159. /d.
160. /d. at 2824.
161. /d. (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (Yale
Univ. Press 1921)).
162. /d.
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ago. 163 Justice Stevens rejects the majority's view that James
Madison consciously chose to limit the apparatus available to elected
officials without compelling evidence to support this contention. 164
Furthermore, the dissent denounces the majority's authorization of
the "common-law process of case-by-case judicial lawmaking" to
identify the boundaries of tolerable gun-control policy. 165 Justice
Stevens asserts, "I fear that the District's policy choice may well be
just the first of an unknown number of dominoes to be knocked off
the table." 166 With this statement, the dissent signaled the inevitable
result of a cataclysmic wave of litigation that could jeopardize the
tools available to elected officials to fight crime. 167
V. PROSPECTIVE OUTLOOK ON THE HELLER DECISION:
UNCERTAINTY LURKS FOR STATES AND CITIES
ACROSS THE COUNTRY
As the landmark case on the meaning of the Second Amendment,
Heller could set off a steady stream of litigation as pro-firearm
interest groups organize challenges to current regulations. 168 This
litigation has the potential to exhaust federal court and governmental
resources where economically struggling cities, states, and the federal
government have to vehemently defend diverse challenges to current
gun regulations. 169 As one expert notes, "the greatest practical effect
of Heller will be to disable crime-ridden urban centers from dealing
with the plague of guns." 170 This unfortunate prediction has come to
fruition as Chicago's gun laws have been challenged. 171 The
magnitude of this wave of litigation, with its matching rip current,
has a strong potential for destruction and the degree of its damaging
erosion will be measured by the resolution of several key issues left

163. /d. at 2847.
164. !d. ("The Court would have us believe that over 200 years ago, the Framers made a
choice to limit the tools available to elected officials wishing to regulate civilian uses
of weapons . . . . I could not possibly conclude that the Framers made such a
choice.").
165. /d.
166. !d. at 2846.
167. See id.
168. See Greenhouse, supra note 10, at AI.
169. Aziz Huq, Justice Scalia's Dueling Opinions, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, June 30,
2008, at para. 13, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=justice_ scalias_dueling
opinions.
170. /d. at para. 15.
171. See id.
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unresolved by Heller, and further, by states' and cities' resolve to
defend current gun measures. 172
A.

An Evolving Issue: The Supreme Court's Incorporation of the
Second Amendment

One of the primary issues left unresolved by Heller relates to the
incorporation of the Second Amendment and whether the courts can
enforce this decision against state and local governments. 173 Until
Congress ratified the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, the Bill of
Rights applied only to the federal government and states and
municipalities legislated under state authority. 174 However, during a
series of post-Civil War cases, the Supreme Court ruled that the
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to incorporate most of the Bill
of Rights to hold state governments accountable for violations. 175
The Court applied a three-prong test for incorporation which
measured whether a particular right "is among those 'fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil
and political institutions,' whether it is 'basic in our system of
jurisprudence,' and whether it is a 'fundamental right, essential to a
fair trial. "' 176 Throughout its history, the Court has never ruled that
the Second Amendment has been incorporated, and Justice Scalia's
majority opinion in Heller emphatically states that incorporation is "a
question not presented by this case." 177 Nonetheless, the Court
172. See id. at paras. 16, 18.
173. Robert A. Levy, District of Columbia v. Heller: What's Next?, CATO UNBOUND, July
14, 2008, http://www.cato-unbound.org/2008/07 /14/robert-a-levy/district-of-columbia
-v-heller-whats-next. "The Fifth Amendment right to grand jury indictment, and
the Seventh Amendment's civil jury right, are the only other rights with any
potential application to modem circumstances that have yet to be incorporated."
Bringing Forward the Right, supra note 19, at 784 n.7.
174. Levy, supra note 173.
175. /d. "The Supreme Court uses a process called 'selective incorporation' to determine
whether specific provisions of the [B]ill of [R]ights are to be applied to the states as
well as to the federal government." Letter from Kathryn M. Rowe, Assistant Attorney
General for Maryland, to Samuel I. Rosenberg, Delegate, Maryland General
Assembly, at 1 n.1 (July 18, 2008) (on file with author), available at
http://www.oag statemd.us/opinions/advice2008/08_03 _rosenberg. pdf [hereinafter
Letter].
176. Letter, supra note 175, at 1 n.1.
177. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2813 n.23 (2008). Lower courts have
consistently held that the Second Amendment does not apply against the states or their
subdivisions. See, e.g., Bach v. Pataki, 408 F.3d 75, 84 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[T]he Second
Amendment's 'right to keep and bear arms' imposes a limitation on only federal, not
state, legislative efforts."); Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 270 (7th
Cir. 1982) ("[A)ppellants offer no authority, other than their own opinion to support
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repeatedly compares the incorporated First Amendment to the
unincorporated Second Amendment as a guarantee of fundamental
individual rights. 178 As groups challenge gun-control regulations in
states and cities throughout the country, the judiciary will be
compelled to resolve this conflict. 179 Although some uncertainty
remains on this issue, the overwhelming sentiment among legal
scholars is that the Court will ultimately incorporate the Second
Amendment. 180 Second Amendment incorporation will allow direct
challenges to state and local governments' gun regulations; however,
the degree to which those regulations will fall depends on the
constitutional standard ofreview. 181
B.

The Undecided Constitutional Standard ofReview in Second
Amendment Cases

Another murky facet of Heller is what constitutional standard the
Court will apply in subsequent cases to determine the type of gun
restrictions that remain permissible. 182 The Court must decide
whether to review gun regulations under rational basis review,
intermediate or "heightened scrutiny" review, or strict scrutiny
review. 183 If the Court chooses to apply a strict standard, it would
their arguments that Presser is no longer good law or would have been decided
differently today .... [T]he [S]econd [A]mendment does not apply to the states ...

.").
178. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2797-99.
179. See Levy, supra note 173. The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in several cases,
most notably in Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 64 (1995), where the Court had an occasion to acknowledge that there are limits to
the government's power to infringe on the right of gun ownership. In Love, Maryland
State police denied the plaintiff her right to purchase a firearm because she had been
arrested four times, even though her arrests had yielded only one misdemeanor
conviction. See id. at 122. Standard Maryland State Police practice required that
police deny applications based on prior arrests even though the relevant statute had
not listed such a ground as a reason for denial. See id.
"It is interesting to note that the Maryland State Police are overruled in 78% of the
appeals taken from permit application denials." See Bringing Fo1Ward the Right,
supra note 19, at 784 n.l2. After Heller, future litigation will challenge the Court's
reluctance to entertain whether the Second Amendment imposes any meaningful
limits on state authority.
180. Levy, supra note 173.
181. See id.
182. /d.
183. /d. Rational basis review requires the plaintiff to bear the burden of showing a
constitutional violation; intermediate or "heightened scrutiny" requires the
government to show its regulation is "substantially" related to an important
governmental interest; and strict scrutiny requires the government to demonstrate a
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frustrate state and local governments' efforts to regulate the
possession and distribution of firearms in the United States. 184
Conversely, a lax standard would allow many current gun regulations
throughout the country to survive constitutional muster. 185 Although
it seems likely that the Court will ultimately apply either intermediate
review or strict scrutiny review based on the Heller decision, the
Court did not definitively choose one particular standard.
1.

The Supreme Court Rejects Rational Basis Review for Second
Amendment Inquiries

The Supreme Court in Heller rejected rational basis review, the
lowest level of scrutiny applied by courts deciding constitutional
issues through judicial review} 86 Rational basis review inquires
whether the governmental action at issue is a reasonable means to an
end that may be legitimately pursued by government. 187 Under this
standard, state and local governments, alike, could easily defend
current gun measures, because the government merely needs to
present one common-sense argument to preserve a law} 88 However,
the majority noted that this low level of review is inappropriate for
Second Amendment review because "[i]f all that was required to
overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a rational basis, the
Second Amendment would be redundant with the separate
constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no
effect." 189 Justice Scalia declared that a higher standard of review is
required when a constitutional right is at issue. 190 The Court could
revisit this standard in the future, which would be favorable to state

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

189.
190.

compelling interest as the Court assumes the regulation is unconstitutional. 16A AM.
JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 403 (2009); 168 AM. JuR. 2D Constitutional Law § 861
(2009).
See Levy, supra note 173 (noting that state governments would have to have stronger
justifications for laws restricting firearms under this standard of scrutiny).
See id. (explaining that a lower level of review functions as a rubber stamp for
legislation).
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2818 n.27 (2008).
168 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 859 (2009).
Levy, supra note 173. For example, in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421
(1819), the goverrunent's argument that the creation of a national bank falls within
Congress's rights because it is a reasonable means for regulating commerce satisfied
rational basis review. See Matthew D. Taggart, Title II of the Americans With
Disabilities Act After Garrett: Defective Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity and Its
Remedial Impact, 91 CAL. L. REv. 827, 845 (2003).
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2818 n.27.
Seeid. at2817-18.
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and local gun-control initiatives, but the Heller decision seems to
foreclose this option. 191
2.

The Supreme Court Refuses to Apply Intermediate Review as
Suggested by Amici Supporting the District of Columbia

Several amicus briefs for Heller urged the Supreme Court to
consider applying an intermediate standard of review. 192 Most
notably, Paul Clement, the Justice Department's Solicitor General,
urged the Court to apply a form of heightened scrutiny in analyzing
firearm regulations. 193 Under heightened scrutiny, the governmental
action must be substantially related to an important governmental
interest. 194 Clement requested the Court to consider "the practical
impact of the challenged restriction on the plaintiffs ability to
possess firearms for lawful purposes ... and ... the strength of the
government's interests in enforcement of the relevant restriction." 195
Clement reminded the Supreme Court that, similar to the Second
Continental Congress expressing its judgments about what type of
"Arms" were appropriate for militia members, Congress in today' s
society holds discretion in regulating "Arms," which includes those
with military uses, through means that further legitimate government
interests. 196 Justice Stevens hinted that intermediate scrutiny would
be appropriate because Heller expressly approves some Second
Amendment statutory restrictions including the types of people who
may exercise the right to bear arms, the places where this freedom
may be exercised, and the ability to buy and sell firearms. 197 The
Court ultimately declined to apply intermediate scrutiny as proposed
191. See Levy, supra note 173.
192. !d.
193. Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 8, District of
Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290).
194. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
195. Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 193, at
8. Clement took exception to the Court of Appeals's adoption of a more categorical
approach that the Second Amendment precludes any prohibition of a category of
"Arms" that can be traced back to the Founding era. !d. at 9. He warns that "[i]f
adopted by this Court, such an analysis could cast doubt on the constitutionality of
existing federal legislation prohibiting the possession of certain firearms, including
machineguns." !d. Clement further argues that "the text and history of the Second
Amendment point to a more flexible standard of review." !d.
196. !d. Clement concluded that "[u]nder an appropriate standard of review, existing
federal regulations, such as the prohibition on machineguns [sic], readily pass
constitutional muster." !d.
197. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2844 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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by Clement, but unlike rational basis review, the Court remained
open to applying this particular standard in the future. 198
3.

The Supreme Court Declines to Honor Plaintiffs Demand for
Strict Scrutiny When Reviewing Gun Regulations

Plaintiff Heller urged the Court to adopt strict scrutiny ·review,
although he claimed that the District of Columbia's gun ban is
unconstitutional no matter what standard of review the Supreme
Court decided to apply. 199 In order to justify a firearm regulation
under strict scrutiny, the government would bear a heavy burden to
demonstrate a compelling state interest for the law and provide
evidence that the restrictions imposed were narrowly tailored,
meaning no more invasive than necessary to accomplish the
government's objectives. 200 The Supreme Court has regularly applied
strict scrutiny to government regulations that infringe on a
fundamental right, which are rights that are "'implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty"' or "'deeply rooted in the Nation's history and
traditions. "'201 The Court refused to entertain Heller's strict scrutiny
argument and rule whether the right to bear arms qualifies as a
fundamental right, but the Court's decision did not foreclose the
judiciary's application of this standard in the future. 202 This is
important because the Court has traditionally held that all protections
in the Bill of Rights are indisputably fundamental, which the Court
could extend in the future to include the right to bear arms. 203 If strict
scrutiny review becomes the standard, state and local governments
will likely bear an insurmountable burden which will result in the
demise of effective gun-control measures throughout the country.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court declined an invitation to select a
particular standard of review in Heller and left this decision to future
cases. 204 The Court agreed with Heller that the District of Columbia's
blanket ban on all functional guns in the home is unconstitutional
"[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny [the Court has] applied to
enumerated constitutional rights," which allowed the Court to remain
ambivalent on the proper standard. 205 However, Justice Scalia
indicated that "there will be time enough to expound upon the
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Greenhouse, supra note 10, at AI.
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2851 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Levy, supra note 173.
Id.
/d.
/d.
/d.

Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817.
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historical justifications for the exceptions we have mentioned if and
when those exceptions come before us." 206 The standard of review
that the Court selects to evaluate gun regulations will largely dictate
current and future firearm statutes' constitutionality. 207
VI. FIGHTING GUN VIOLENCE: BALTIMORE CITY'S
CHALLENGE FOLLOWING HELLER
The Heller decision will pose a great obstacle in American cities'
endeavors to curtail and manage firearm casualties. 208 Prior to the
Supreme Court striking down Washington, D.C.'s total ban on
handgun possession and its trigger-lock requirement, eleven
American cities joined in unison to write a brief to support the
District of Columbia. 209 The amici's chief concern entailed "ensuring
that states and localities retain the flexibility to counter the risks of
guns to protect public safety through reasonable firearms
regulations." 210 Although gun violence afflicts the entire nation, large
cities have been disproportionately affected over the past thirty
years. 211
The eleven-city amici focused on the threat of gun violence, which
is a sobering reality for citizens living in an urban setting. 212
Research indicates that twenty-five percent of low income urban
youth have witnessed a murder. 213 In addition, urban dwellers are
sixty percent more likely to fall victim to a violent crime compared to
those living in the suburbs and are eighty-two percent more likely
compared to citizens residing in a rural area. 214 American cities have

206. !d. at 2821.
207. See Andrew R. Gould, The Hidden Amendment Framework Within District of
Columbia v. Heller, 62 V AND. L. REv. 1535, 1548-51 (2009).
208. See Greenhouse, supra note 10, at AI.
209. Brief for Amici Curiae Major American Cities, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 1, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290)
[hereinafter Amici]. The cities that represented the amici include: Baltimore,
Cleveland, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, New York City, Oakland, Philadelphia,
Sacramento, San Francisco, Seattle, and Trenton. !d.
210. !d.
211. !d. at 5. The U.S. Department of Justice reports that large American cities witnessed
approximately 340,000 homicides over this time span and sixty-four percent of these
homicides involved guns. !d. at 4-5.
212. See id. at 1.
213. FIREARM & INJURY CENTER AT PENN, FIREARM INJURY IN THE U.S. 20 (2006),
available
at
http://www.uphs.upenn.edu/ficap/resourcebook/pdf/monograph.pdf
[hereinafter FIREARM & INJURY CENTER).
214. See Amici, supra note 209, at 2.
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achieved a reduction in violent crime since its peak in the 1990s, but
there are still remarkably high homicide rates. 215 For example, in
2006, approximately 9000 homicides occurred in American cities
with populations greater than 100,000 citizens. 216
A pertinent component of this issue relates to whether a higher rate
of gun possession breeds more crime. 217 Some researchers argue that
Heller will not have a profound negative impact on American cities'
safety because an increase in the prevalence of guns could actually
result in a decrease in crime. 218 An evolving theory in criminology
suggests that an armed victim may deter criminals from attempting a
crime. 219 Studies reveal nearly forty percent of convicted felons in
one survey claimed that they decided not to commit a crime because
of the trepidation that their potential victim may be carrying a gun. 220
In another survey of incarcerated criminals, eighty percent concurred
with the statement that "a smart criminal always tries to find out if his
potential victim is armed." 221 Gun control opponents argue that if the
government repealed laws that restrict the general population from
obtaining firearms, crime would decline because criminals respond
rationally to deterrence threats. 222
However, despite these theoretical claims, empirical data
demonstrates that there is a strong correlation between local gun
ownership and gun-related crime. 223 During the ten-year period after
the District of Columbia's ban on handgun acquisitions in 1976, the
number of homicides and suicides declined approximately twentyfive percent in Washington, D.C., led by a declining rate of gunrelated homicides and suicides. 224 Similarly, Chicago witnessed a
215. !d. at 5.
216. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES 2 (2006), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/data/table_l2.html.
217. See Jennifer McMenamin, Justices Back Gun Owners, Court Upholds Right to Keep
Weapons at Home, BALT. SUN, June 27, 2008, at AI (citing Washington, D.C. Mayor
Adrian Fenty who believes more guns will lead to more violence and Rep. Cummings
who expressed frustration with the decision).
218. !d.
219. JAMES D. WRIGHT & PETER H. ROSSI, ARMED AND CONSIDERED DANGEROUS: A
SURVEY OF FELONS AND THEIR FIREARMS 15 (Aldine De Gruyler expanded ed., 1994)
(1986).
220. !d. at 155.
221. !d. at 15.
222. See id.
223. Edward L. Glaeser & Spencer Glendon, Who Owns Guns? Criminals, Victims, and the
Culture of Violence, 88 AM. ECON. REv. 458,461 (1998).
224. Colin Loftin, Ph.D., David McDowall, Ph.D., Brian Wiersema & Talbert J. Cottey,
M.S., Effects of Restrictive Licensing of Handguns on Homicide and Suicide in the
District of Columbia, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1615, 1616 (1991). Criminologists
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decrease in homicides following a general handgun ban in 1982. 225
These examples highlight the almost certain rise in crime that will
occur in the District of Columbia after the city repeals its total ban on
handguns. In addition, although a significant number of gun owners
use their firearms for recreational purposes, surveys suggest that
nearly half of gun owners claim their primary motivation for
possessing a gun relates to self-protection against crime. 226
Currently, criminals use guns in only about one-quarter of robberies
and approximately one out of every twenty assaults. 227 However, if
increased gun possession among potential victims causes criminals to
carry and use guns more frequently to avoid armed self-defense, then
violent crime will inevitably increase. 228 This cause-and-effect
relationship between civilian and criminal gun ownership, 229
enhanced by the elimination of proven gun measures in cities, could
precipitate an arms race that will result in more lethal attacks.
The primary culprit that accounts for a vast majority of homicides
throughout large cities is handguns. 230 Although handguns represent
only one-third of the total amount of firearms in the U.S., 231 criminals
are seven times more likely to use a handgun to commit a violent

originally questioned the efficacy of the District of Columbia's handgun ban enacted
in 1976 and whether other factors played a role in the city's homicide and suicide
decline. Jd. at 1618. Researchers first compared the District of Columbia's gun crime
statistics to the neighboring affluent Maryland and Virginia suburban cities and
concluded that Washington, D.C. had achieved a greater decline in gun violence due
to the total handgun ban. Jd. Critics, however, moved to compare Washington, D.C.
to Baltimore, a similarly situated city in the region, to facilitate more meaningful
results. Phillip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Aiming for Evidence-Based Gun Policy, 25 J.
PoLICY ANALYSIS & MGMT. 691, 709 (2006). This revised study demonstrated that
Baltimore had experienced an analogous decline in homicides in 1976, related to a
similar decrease in the volume of guns. Jd.
225. Brief and App. of Professors of Criminal Justice as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 2010 WL 59027 (No. 08-1521).
226. PHILLIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, DUKE U. TERRY SANFORD INST. OF PUB. POL'Y, THE
SOCIAL COST OF GUN OWNERSHIP 8, SAN04-07 (Dec. 2004), available at http://
www.sanford.duke.edu/research/papers/san04-07.pdf [hereinafter THE SOCIAL CosT
OF GUN OWNERSHIP].
227. MICHAEL R. RAND, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION, 2008 at 6, (Sept. 2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/cv08.pdf.
228. See THE SOCIAL COST OF GUN OWNERSHIP, supra note 226, at 7-8.
229. See id. at 8.
230. See Amici, supra note 209, at 5.
231. PHILLIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUNS IN AMERICA: RESULTS OF A COMPREHENSNE
SURVEY OF GUN OWNERSHIP AND USE 13 ( 1996).
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crime compared to any other weapon. 232 As a member of the elevencity amici, Baltimore City typifies the general escalating trend of
violent crime attributable to firearms and, in particular, handguns. 233
In 2007, nearly ninety-nine percent of all Baltimore City's homicides
caused by firearms involved the use of a handgun. 234 As Washington,
D.C. struggles to redraft its gun regulations, Baltimore City confronts
a daunting task of preserving gun regulations and formulating future
innovative initiatives to combat gun violence amidst potential
litigation. 235
A.

Baltimore City's Grim Violent Reality: A Perpetual Presence of
Gun Violence

Gun violence has gripped Baltimore City for several decades. 236
Although Baltimore's total number of homicides fluctuates each year,
the annual homicide figure remains dangerously high. 237 In 2007,
Baltimore, a city of approximately 631,000 residents, witnessed 232
homicides caused by guns, which represented its highest total since
1999. 238 The impact of deadly gun incidents has emerged as a true
epidemic afflicting both adults and youths alike. 239 Dr. Joshua M.
Sharfstein, Commissioner of the Baltimore City Health Department,
noted that homicide represents the leading cause of death in
adolescents and young adults in the city. 240 Gun violence also poses a
detrimental danger to police officers and first responders. 24 I Reports
show that five Baltimore City officers tragically fell victim to
shootings between 1997 and 2007. 242
232.

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

240.
241.
242.

CRAIG PERKINS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION
SURVEY, 1993-2001: WEAPONS USE AND VIOLENT CRIME 3 (Sept. 2003), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/wuvcOl.pdf. From 1993 to 2001, handguns
accounted for more than 700,000 incidents of violent crime each year. Jd.
Amici, supra note 209, at 6-7.
!d. at 7.
See id. at 8, 25; see also infra Part IV.B (discussing Baltimore City's current and
future gun policies under review).
See Amici, supra note 209, at 6.
See id. at 7.
Jd.
See Press Release, Sheila Dixon, Mayor, Bait. City, Mayor Dixon Launches Safe
Streets Weekend (June 13, 2008), available at http://www.baltimorehealth.org/press/
2008_ 06_13 .safestreets.pdf [hereinafter Mayor Dixon Launches].
Jd.
See Amici, supra note 209, at 7.
See The Officer Down Memorial Page, Inc., http://www.odmp.org/agency/214baltimore-city-policedepartment-maryland (last visited Mar. 30, 2010). Baltimore is
part of a general disturbing national trend involving police shootings: between 1997
and 2006, ninety-three percent of fallen police officers in the United States were killed
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Homicide totals demonstrate only a portion of the grave impact of
gun violence in Baltimore. 243 In addition to the deadly gun attacks,
650 non-fatal shootings occurred in the city in 2007- nearly two per
day.244
From a public health perspective, the impact of firearms on suicide
rates ranks equally as important because guns increase the lethality of
suicide attempts. 245 Approximately fifty percent of all suicides in
Baltimore tragically involved firearm use. 246
Furthermore, the social ramifications of gun violence are palpable
in American cities and are similarly felt in Baltimore. City residents'
quality of life suffers due to the constant barrage of shootings and
violent crime that disturb the peace. 247 As one commentator states,
"[g]un violence is what makes people afraid to go to the comer store
at night." 248 Gun violence has partially contributed to a declining
Baltimore population as the city lost 11.5% of its population in the
1990s. 249 The monetary costs associated with gun shootings have
placed an additional heavy burden on large cities' budgets like
Baltimore's. 250 Gun injuries serve as the primary cause of uninsured
hospital stays and American taxpayers bear approximately half of the
medical costs of gunshot injuries. 251 Baltimore has not escaped these

243.
244.
245.

246.
247.

248.
249.

250.
251.

by a gun. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TABLE 27LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KiLLED & AsSAULTED, 2006 (Oct. 2007), available at
http://www.tbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/data/table_l2html.
In 2006, the deaths of a
staggering forty-six out of forty-eight officers killed in the line of duty were directly
attributable to a firearm. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS FELONIOUSLY KiLLED (Oct. 2006), available at
http://www.tbi.gov/ucr/killed/2006/downloadable pdfs/feloniouslykilled.pdf.
See Amici, supra note 209, at 8 (discussing the costs associated with hospital care and
treatment of shooting victims).
I d. at 6.
Jd. at 7; see FIREARM & INJURY CENTER, supra note 213 (noting that firearms are
involved in approximately fifty-five percent of suicides, which is the most common
method of suicide).
Loftin, eta!., supra note 224, at 1616.
See Amici, supra note 209, at 5 (noting that urban dwellers are sixty percent more
likely to be victims of violent crimes than residents of suburbs and eighty-two percent
more likely than rural dwellers).
J. M. Kalil, A New Approach: Prosecutors Take Aim at Gun Crimes, LAS VEGAS REv.
J., Mar. 8, 2002, at lB.
DeWayne Wickham, Baltimore Goes From Urban Revival to Angst, USA TODAY,
July I, 2001, http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/columnists/wickham/2001-060 1-wickham.htm.
See Amici, supra note 209, at 7-8.
Jd. at 7. This trend affiicts nearly every large city in the country. For example,
Milwaukee expends more than $4000 to send trained personnel to respond to each
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expenses as it cost approximately $30.2 million to provide hospital
treatment for the city's 657 non-fatal shooting victims in 2006. 252
This unnecessary drain on Baltimore City's resources reduces
revenue that the city could expend to curtail illegal gun possession,
which is now a more complex endeavor after the Heller decision.

B.

Baltimore City's Current and Future Gun Policies under Review

The most pertinent question presented by the Supreme Court's
decision in Heller relates to what degree cities like Baltimore will
Assuming the Court
have to scale back gun regulations. 253
affirmatively incorporates the Second Amendment, cities across the
country will likely face constitutional challenges to current and future
gun regulations. 254 In Baltimore City, there are several laws that the
Heller decision will jeopardize, and the Court's decision will also
cripple Baltimore's ability to implement proven innovative gunprevention measures in the future. 255
1.

Baltimore City's Trigger-Lock Requirement in Jeopardy

The contentious litigation related to the Heller decision could
challenge Baltimore City's regulation that mandates trigger locks on
all licensed firearms that are accessible to minors. 256 The Baltimore
City Code defines a "child safety lock," or trigger lock, as "[a] device
that, when locked in place, prevents the trigger from being moved
and can itself be removed only by using a key or combination." 257
Baltimore City's trigger-lock requirement fits the precise type of
regulation that Heller invalidated because it interferes with an
individual's right to readily use functional firearms in the home. 258
Upon striking down Washington, D.C.'s trigger-lock law, the Court
shooting. /d. at 8. In addition, in 2005, the average hospital bill to provide care to a
shooting victim in Milwaukee exceeded $38,000, not including rehabilitation or
physician fees. /d.
252. /d.
253. Greenhouse, supra note 10, at AI.
254. See Levy, supra note 173.
255. See, e.g., Mayor Dixon Launches, supra note 239, at I (describing a recent initiative
to prevent shootings and killings that was modeled after an effective Chicago Program
known as CeaseFire).
256. BALT. CITY, Mo., CODE art. 19, § 59-12(a)-(b) (2009).
257. !d.§ 59-ll(c).
258. See supra Part IV. The Court invalidated D.C. Code § 7-2507.02 which required
lawfully owned firearms to be "unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock
or similar device unless such firearm[s are] kept at [the firearm owner's] place of
business, or [are] being used for lawful recreational purposes within the District of
Columbia." WASH., D.C. CODE§ 7-2507.02 (2001).
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held that its regulation "makes it impossible for citizens to use them
for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and is hence
unconstitutional."259 Baltimore City officials can strive to distinguish
its trigger-lock mandate from Washington, D.C.'s law, because
Baltimore's regulation does not require gun owners to keep all
firearms both "unloaded and disassembled," a requirement which
elicited the ire of the Heller majority. 260
Baltimore City
representatives can argue that its trigger-lock requirement is
minimally invasive because the regulation achieves its purpose of
increasing safety while merely requiring the gun owner to take an
extra step to unlock the firearm. 261 However, the Heller majority
took exception to similar locking mechanisms that interfere with an
individual's use of a firearm, which likely implicates that Baltimore's
law would be found to be unconstitutional as welf62
Future challenges to Baltimore City's gun-lock requirement will
likely defeat this codified gun-control measure, which will result in
more gun accidents and a higher rate of criminals illegally acquiring
guns. 263 Trigger locks aid in the prevention of accidents and
mishandling of firearms, because they immobilize the trigger or
hammer of the firearm to which they are attached, preventing
inadvertent discharge. 264 Baltimore's law, in particular, requires
users to input a key or the correct combination which serves to
protect children from inadvertent use of the firearm. 265 Furthermore,
in order to use many trigger locks effectively, the owner must remove
the ammunition from the gun before engaging the lock, which acts as
a shield to thwart criminals from stealing another's gun and readily

259. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2818 (2008).
260. Id. Baltimore City Code provides that the gun may be loaded so long as the child
safety lock is engaged. § 59-12(b)(3).
261. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2844.
262. If Baltimore's child safety lock "render[s]" the firearm inoperable in the home "for
immediate self-defense," it may very well be unconstitutional under Heller. See id. at
2821-22.
263. See id. at 2856-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that statistics with respect to harm
to children and adolescents are "particularly striking" based in part on criminals'
access to handguns and handgun use during the commission of violent crimes).
264. See § 59-ll(c) (describing effect of child safety locks). Firearms experts determined
that any trigger lock that gun owners could disengage in fewer than three seconds
would comply with the Heller decision. See Nikita Stewart & Michael Birnbaum,
Lots of Questions, Little Agreement at D.C. Hearing on Gun Laws, WASH. PosT, July
3, 2008, at Bl.
265. BALT. CITY, Mo., CODE art. 19, §§ 59-ll(c), 59-12(a)-(b).
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using it to perpetrate a crime. 266 With the probable termination of this
law, the rise in accidental gun casualties and the volume of gun thefts
may very well swell, which will compromise safety on Baltimore's
streets.
2.

Baltimore City's Code Provision That Criminalizes All Firearm
Discharges Will Likely Be Challenged

Post-Heller cases will also likely challenge Baltimore City's code
provision that criminalizes the discharge of any firearm within city
limits. Baltimore City Code, article 19, section 59-2(a) prohibits any
firearm expulsion unless the discharge occurred during a licensed
military parade. 267 This Baltimore firearm regulation arguably runs
afoul of Heller, because it prevents the individual use of firearms for
the purpose of self-defense in the home without punishment. 268
Specifically, this regulation states:
If any person shall fire or discharge any gun, pistol, or
firearm within the City, unless it be on some occasion of
military parade, and then by order of some officer having
the command, every such person for every such offense
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, pay
a fine not to exceed $1,000, or be imprisoned for a term not
to exceed 1 year, or both. 269
The Baltimore City Code qualifies this law by including an
exception that permits firearm discharge at pre-approved Baltimore
City Police Department target ranges. 270 However, if challenged, this
provision would likely fail constitutional review, because this law
institutes a blanket ban on firearm expulsion within city limits and
criminalizes one of the basic protections guaranteed by Heller-the
right to use firearms for self-defense. 271 On account of this
provision's susceptibility to annulment, the overall use of firearms

266. John R. Lott, Jr. and John E. Whitley, Safe-Storage Gun Laws: Accidental Deaths,
Suicides, and Crime, 44 J.L. & EcoN. 659, 660 (2001).
267. § 59-2(a).
268. See id.
269. !d.
270. !d. § 59-2(c) ("Nothing in this section shall be held to apply to or prohibit the
discharge or firing of any such firearms on permanently located, properly posted and
bona fide target ranges, the location of which has been filed [sic] with the Police
Department of Baltimore City.").
271. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817-18 (2008) (explaining the
"inherent right of self-defense").
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will most certainly increase because the deterrence factor of criminal
punishment would be neutralized.
3.

Heller Has Eliminated Several Innovative Measures That Were
Previously Available to Baltimore City to Combat Gun Violence

The Supreme Court has taken several proven gun-control methods
off the policy table and has effectively frozen some of the existing
gun-control political victories. 272 Over the past decade, Baltimore
City has considered several regulatory methods to discourage
handgun ownership, including a deterrence system whereby the city
collaborates with federal prosecutors to punish felons for a minimum
five-year prison sentence. 273 In addition, other states and cities have
devised innovative gun control measures, like Illinois's proposed law
that would require gun owners to carry personal liability insurance of
at least $1 million for "any damages resulting from negligent or
willful acts involving the use of such firearm," which would further
deter handgun ownership. 274 Although none of these provisions have
been passed into law, the Heller decision has crippled the possibility
of these and similar measures from ever being passed in Baltimore
City and in other cities in the future.
Another type of innovative crime prevention operation that the
Heller decision will serve to thwart is New York City's multifaceted
campaign instituted in the 1990s. 275 In response to a historic number
of homicides in 1990, New York City began launching several
firearm regulations to curtail crime. 276 In 1991, officials initiated a
complete ban on assault weapons within city limits. 277 Following this
successful provision and state mandated licensing requirements, New
York City also mandated trigger-lock requirements on all long arms
and handguns in 1998 and 2000, respectively. 278 The results of this

272. !d. at 2846 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (fearing that the invalidation of the D.C. gun
control laws by Heller "may well be just the first of an unknown number of dominoes
to be knocked off the table").
273. See Tim Craig, Ehrlich Makes Pledge on Guns, BALT. SUN, Oct. 30, 2002, at 81.
274. lllinois Bill Would Require Gun Owners to Buy $1M in Liability Insurance, INS. J.,
Feb. 18, 2009, http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/midwest/2009/02/18/97987.
htm.
275. Amici, supra note 209, at 10.
276. !d. In 1990, New York City witnessed a historic high of 2245 murders, the most in
the United States. !d.
277. !d.
278. !d. The state of New York adopted a similar statewide trigger-lock requirement in
2000. !d. at I0-11. Future litigation will likely jeopardize this provision, as the
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anti-gun campaign proved staggering as the shooting incidents in
New York City declined over seventy-one percent from 1993 to 2005
and the homicide rate fell fifty-four percent. 279 Furthermore, New
York City adopted the nation's toughest penalty for carrying a
loaded, unlicensed assault weapon and handgun in 2006, which
raised the mandatory minimum sentence from one to three-and-a-half
years. 280 This law proved equally effective as the homicide rate in
New York City fell to its lowest level ever officially recorded in
2007. 281 This general reduction in violent crime came during a time
period when New York City's population expanded from 7.3 to 8.1
million citizens. 282 Baltimore City would benefit from a similar
operation in order to reduce crime, but future litigation related to
Heller would nullify a similar campaign because these regulations
would not survive constitutional challenges.
4.

The State of Maryland's Law under Fire: The Imminent Impact
of Straw Purchases on Baltimore City

The actions of the State of Maryland could additionally exacerbate
the safety of Baltimore City's residents as Heller could jeopardize the
state's gun-rationing system. In 1996, the Maryland General
Assembly passed the landmark Maryland Gun Violence Act, which
mandated a limit on handgun purchases to no "more than one
regulated firearm in a 30-day period."283 The Maryland State
Assembly instituted this common-sense regulation to curtail straw
purchases whereby criminals coordinate illegal gun transactions with
buyers who have clean criminal records. 284 A straw purchaser is
Heller decision struck down the District of Columbia's gun-lock requirement. See
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821-22.
279. Amici, supra note 209, at 11.
280. /d.
281. /d.
282. /d.
283. Mo. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY§ 5-128(b) (LexisNexis 2003). The Senate received the
bill from the House on April 3, 1996, and debated its contents within the Senate
Finance Committee where the bill passed 31-15. Bill1nfo-1996 Regular Session-HB
297, http://rnlis.state.md.us/1996rs/Billfile/hb0297.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2010).
Upon review, Maryland Governor Parris Glendening signed the bill into law on May
23, 1996. /d.
284. Although Congress has repeatedly refused to pass a comparable national law,
proponents of gun rationing have argued before Congress to limit gun purchases
because "the life of a handgun seems to be measured in decades, generations, and
even centuries," which has helped to galvanize the gun-rationing movement on the
state level. See 139 CONG. REc. S31641-42 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993) (statement of
Sen. Moynihan).
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typically used when the actual buyer is prohibited from possessing
firearms, such as a convicted felon or an individual who is less than
twenty-one years of age. 285 These transactions plague the East Coast
as many of the weapons end up in the northeastern cities where straw
purchasers attempt to sell the guns for a profit. 286 However,
Maryland's gun-rationing law dramatically hindered the profitability
of gun running because gun traffickers could only purchase one
firearm per month.
Baltimore City is the chief beneficiary of this law as the number of
Maryland multiple-sale guns turning up at crime scenes after the law
took effect fell over seventy-five percent within the city limits. 287 In
1995, Maryland State Police set up Operation Maryland Cease Fire to
investigate some of the larger volume purchases that were suspected
of bringing a disproportionate number of firearms to the streets of
Baltimore. 288 During one instance, Maryland State Police went to the
home of a twenty-one-year-old man who had recently bought twentyseven guns in several pawnshops in the Baltimore suburbs. 289 Upon
further investigation, the police found that the guns had been resold
to a Baltimore narcotics ring. 290 State laws addressing straw
purchases can be an effective means to curtail the number of guns on
the street which ultimately results in less crime and less violence. 291
However, despite the significant progress against straw purchases,
285. Annie Linskey, Illicit Guns Flow into Maryland, BALT. SUN, June 1, 2008, at Al.
286. /d.
287. PhilipP. Pan, Md. Handgun Sales Down 25 Percent; Drop Comes Year After One-AMonth Buying Limit Was Imposed, WASH. PosT, May 27, 1998, at Al. Maryland
witnessed a drastic reduction in gun transactions immediately after the state imposed
purchasing limits in 1996. !d. Handgun sales plummeted more than twenty-five
percent during the first year of the law, and the state witnessed an eighty percent
decrease in multiple-gun sales. /d.
288. Pennsylvanians Against Trafficking Handguns Frequently Asked Questions, http://
bradynetwork.org/site/DocServer/PATH_F AQ.pdf?dociD=361 (last visited Feb. 1,
2010).
289. !d.
290. /d.; see Mayors Against Illegal Guns, Inside Straw Purchasing: How Criminals Get
Guns 1//ega//y, at 3, available at http://www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/down
loads/pdf/inside-straw-purchases.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 201 0) [hereinafter Mayors
Against Illegal Guns] (explaining that when police recover a gun at a crime scene, the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms uses the gun's serial number to determine
"where it first left the legal market-tracing from the first sale of the firearm by an
importer or manufacturer, to the wholesaler or retailer, to the first retail purchaser. ln
some cases, that first retail purchaser is the link between the legal and illegal
markets").
291. See Mayors Against Illegal Guns, supra note 290, at 19.

460

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 39

zealous gun-rights advocates will likely seek to overturn this law on
Second Amendment grounds.
Challengers will argue that gun-rationing laws set an
unconstitutional precedent for the government to quantitatively limit
the exercise of citizens' right to bear arms. 292 They will contend that
one-gun-per-month statutes check an individual's Second
Amendment rights unlawfully because the government could not
similarly restrict one's right to speak freely only once per month as
protected by the First Amendment, deny a citizen the right to refrain
from incriminating himself or herself more than once per month
pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, or curtail a citizen's right to obtain
counsel to only one time per month if accused of a crime as protected
by the Sixth Amendment. 293 As a result of the impending challenges
to the state's gun-rationing laws, Baltimore City will almost probably
witness a spike in multi-sale firearms, which would once again
plague its neighborhoods.
C.

Baltimore City's Methods to Stem the Heller Aftermath

Despite the potential challenges ahead, Baltimore City's safety will
not entirely be compromised because some of its most effective gun
measures should pass constitutional muster. 294
1.

Baltimore City's Gun-Control Measures That Will Likely
Withstand Litigation

Baltimore's criminal surveillance program will most likely survive
constitutional challenges. Baltimore requires criminals to register
with the City Police Commissioner within 48 hours of a documented
violation of a firearm law. 295 In addition, criminals must update their
information on a regular basis. 296 This Baltimore City law requires

292. Challenges will most certainly overturn the most recent controlling decision in the
Maryland high courts, Scherr v. Handgun Permit Review Bd., 163 Md. App. 417, 450,
880 A.2d 1137, 1156 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) ("[T)here [is no case that] supports
the proposition that the mere fact that a constitution provides for the establishment of
a militia means that the citizens have a right to bear arms.").
293. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2786, 2790 (2008).
294. See, e.g., Mayor Dixon Launches, supra note 239, at l.
295. BALT. CITY, MD., CODE art. 19, § 60-4(a) (2008). This provision provides that the
offender must register within forty-eight hours of "(l) the date that the sentence is
imposed, if the gun offender receives a sentence that does not include imprisonment;
(2) the date that probation before judgment is granted; (3) or the date of release from a
correctional facility, if the gun offender receives a sentence that includes
imprisonment." /d.
296. /d. § 60-6(b).
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that "within 20 calendar days after each 6-month anniversary of a gun
offender's initial registration, the gun offender must personally
appear at an office designated by the Police Commissioner to verify
and update, as appropriate, the contents of the registration. " 297
Although this provision interferes with an individual's right to bear
arms, Baltimore City could capitalize on the majority opinion that
made clear that the Heller decision protects only "the right of lawabiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and
home. " 298 In addition, this regulation would survive even strict
scrutiny review, because it serves a compelling state interest related
to preventing repeat offenders from committing future crimes, and it
is narrowly tailored to achieve that objective because the law only
applies to citizens who have committed gun crimes in the past. 299
Baltimore City's law, which bans the use of stun guns within city
limits, could also survive the onslaught of future litigation. 300 The
Heller majority declared that the right to bear arms is extended to
modem weapons just as an individual's First Amendment right is
extended to modem forms of communication. 301 One could argue
that the blanket ban against possession or use of stun guns, especially
within an individual's home, interferes with one's mode of selfdefense similar to the District of Columbia's total ban on handgun
Baltimore City could likely overcome this challenge,
use. 302
however, by arguing that it has a compelling state interest in
preventing the misuse of "dangerous and unusual weapons," which
Heller determined should not have constitutional protection.
Baltimore's law also adheres to the narrowly tailored requirement
because it singles out only these prohibited arms. 303
2.

Baltimore City's Non-Regulatory Programs to Halt Violence

Baltimore City has also instituted several community outreach
programs to curtail illegal gun possession and the prevalence of
violent crime. 304 For example, in 2008, Baltimore launched its "Safe
297. /d. § 60-6(b)(l).
298. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821-22.
299. See id. at 2851-52.
300. BALT. CITY, Mo., CODE art. 19, § 59-28(a)(2) (2003) ("It further shall be unlawful for
any person to possess, fire, or discharge any such stun gun or electronic device within
the City.").
301. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2791-92.
302. See id. at 2821-22.
303. See supra notes 134-35, 300 and accompanying text.
304. See Mayor Dixon Launches, supra note 239, at 1.
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Streets" campaign, which City authorities modeled after the effective
CeaseFire Chicago plan developed at the University of Illinois
School of Public Health. 305 This program has successfully reduced
shootings and homicides in targeted areas by approximately twentyfive percent. 306
Safe Streets collaborates with community
organizations to develop and implement strategies to curtail violent
crime. 307
Former Baltimore City Mayor, Sheila Dixon,
acknowledged the program's progress stating: "'Safe Streets is
helping us reduce shooting and homicides in Baltimore. . . . This
effort demonstrates that everyone has a role to play in making
Baltimore safer. "' 308 After the initial success of the program in
targeted areas, Baltimore officials decided to expand the program to
the entire city. 309 Baltimore City's health commissioner signaled the
importance of this expansion noting, "Safe Streets represents a
significant opportunity for Baltimore communities to reduce violence
by changing behavior, a key strategy in public health." 310 The
combination of local outreach programs and strong gun-control
measures has helped curb crime.
In addition to internal strategies to reduce gun violence, Baltimore
has also joined an east coast coalition to combat illegal gun
possession. 311 In February 2008, Baltimore City hosted a regional
conference with mayors and police chiefs from cities in seven states
that identified the necessity to collaborate as a region to combat
illegal gun dealers. 312 The coalition's ultimate objective involves
constructing a "clearinghouse of criminal evidence" for regional
police departments to penetrate the "Iron Pipeline," a gun trafficking
network that traverses the interstate highway corridor from New
York City to Baltimore. 313 This cooperative scheme could have a
305. Id.
306. Press Release, Sheila Dixon, Mayor, Bait. City, Mayor Dixon Announces Safe Streets
Expansion at 1 (Aug. 8, 2008), I, available at http://www.baltimorehealth.org/press/
2008_ 08_08.SafeStreets.pdf [hereinafter Safe Streets Expansion].
307. Mayor Dixon Launches, supra note 239, at 1. Furthermore, Safe Streets organizes
outreach workers, faith leaders, and other prominent figures within communities to
intervene in conflicts to promote alternatives to violence. Jd.
308. Safe Streets Expansion, supra note 306, at I.
309. Id. at 1-2.
310. Mayor Dixon Launches, supra note 239, at I.
311. Press Release, Sheila Dixon, Mayor, Bait. City, Mayor Dixon and Mayor Bloomberg
Host Mayors' Regional Violence Reduction Summit in Baltimore at I (Feb. 13,
2008), available at http://www.baltimorecity.gov/LinkClick.aspx?filetickect=PqCFp
SxQqoo%3dtabid=ll77&mid=2230 [hereinafter Regional Violence Summit].
312. Id.
313. See id. at 1-2.
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significant effect in reducing the illegal gun traffic between cities,
noted New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg. 314 This coalition's
cohesiveness will become more vital than ever in combating urban
crime in the post-Heller era.
However, it is undeniable that unless Baltimore City fights to
protect its current gun restrictions and proactively enacts future
provisions to curtail gun violence, these non-regulatory schemes will
cease to make a major impact on Baltimore City's safety because
weak crime-prevention laws will not deter criminals from obtaining
guns. For this reason, this Comment offers the following two
recommendations to continue the fight to reduce gun violence m
Baltimore City.

a.

Recommendation #1: Fight to retain current gun measures

Baltimore City should refrain from repealing any of its current gun
regulations. Although the potential exists that gun rights advocates
could overturn the city's trigger-lock provision, Baltimore should not
alter this provision and should be prepared to defend such a suit. In
the wake of the Heller decision, Washington, D.C. enacted
emergency legislation to appease the gun lobbyists, but refused to
completely erase the trigger-lock requirement. 315 Washington, D.C.
officials continued the mandate that all guns in the home must be
stored unloaded and secured with a trigger lock or in a gun safe, but
added an exception that would not require the lock when a reasonably
perceived threat of immediate harm existed. 316 In response, plaintiff
Dick Heller has launched another lawsuit to challenge the modified
provision, which experts claim, "could take months, if not years, to
resolve." 317 This development is a political victory because, until the
courts resolve Heller's new suit, the new regulations will remain in
place.
Similarly, it is paramount that Baltimore defends this
particular provision, because a potential domino effect could occur if
one law falls under the Heller precedent.
As evidence of this effect, the gun regulatory dominoes have begun
to fall in the Chicago metropolitan area. 318 First, Morton Grove, a
/d.
See Michael Falcone, Washington Council Enacts Tough Gun-Control Measure, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 17,2008, at Al9.
316. Del Quentin Wilber & Paul Duggan, New York on Guns Facing Lawsuit, WASH. POST,
July 29, 2008, at Bl.
317. /d.
318. See Deborah Horan, Evanston Latest Suburb to Repeal Handgun Ban in Wake of High
Court Ruling, CHI. TRIBUNE, Aug. 12, 2008, at Dl.
314.
315.
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village north of Chicago, voluntarily lifted one of the oldest handgun
bans in the country, which had effectively combated the crime that
migrated from the City into the village. 319 However, despite the
handgun ban's success, Morton Grove's mayor refused to wait for a
legal battle because the town had every intention to comply with the
Supreme Court's ruling, as it proposed and passed an ordinance that
eliminated the possession-of-handgun ban within the village. 320
Second, the City of Evanston repealed its handgun ban in order to
avoid the expense of combating a lawsuit recently filed by the
National Rifle Association. 321 An Evanston City Council member
stated, "this city was facing hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal
expenses. We'll be better off getting [the ordinance] off the
books."322 Although some municipalities have rescinded total firearm
bans, some Chicago towns have elected to amend their ordinances to
include some restrictions, whereas others have repealed handgun
bans while resolving to enact restrictions at a later date. 323 Baltimore
City should resist any cost-saving litigation tactics and refrain from
voluntarily repealing any of its laws because, as discussed earlier, the
consequences of losing effective gun regulatory measures are
immeasurable.
b.

Recommendation #2: Remain proactive in creating new tactics

Most importantly, Baltimore City must continue to devise
innovative regulatory schemes that will combat gun violence.
Although city-wide programs like Safe Streets have successfully
galvanized the community to combat gun violence, Baltimore City
must not stop there, but must continue to plan and implement cuttingedge initiatives. The Heller decision has eliminated the potential for
cities like Baltimore to enact city-wide handgun bans, but the
Supreme Court's ruling has not entirely squelched a progressive
enterprise to regulate handgun possession within city limits. 324 For
instance, in the face of litigation, New York City has announced that
it will continue to pursue "reasonable regulations," including
instituting a progressive licensing scheme to further screen gun
transactions and requiring gun owners to both register their firearms

319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

/d.
See id.
ld.
See id. (alteration in original).
ld.
See supra Part VI.C.
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every three years and undergo a criminal background check every six
years. 325
Baltimore should similarly take advantage of the Heller decision
and the fact that the Court has eliminated the gun-rights advocates'
slippery-slope argument that government has the discretion to enact
blanket bans on guns. Consequently, the common-sense gun control
provisions that Washington, D.C. has devised will no longer be
viewed as "the final step before firearm confiscation. " 326 Baltimore
City should pursue proactive measures to tighten its grip on
combating illegal gun purchases and broadcast a strong message to
criminals that law enforcement will not tolerate violent crime.
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite the current firearm regulatory struggles in the courts
throughout the country, cities must not be deterred by potential
litigation that challenges present gun laws. Heller poses the greatest
threat not to current gun regulations, but rather to future innovative
regulatory schemes. 327 American cities could come to fear the risk of
possible litigation and could choose a more conservative approach to
avoid constitutional conflict. 328 Baltimore, like its counterparts
throughout the country, must remain proactive in its response to
combat gun violence despite the judicial resistance. If city officials
do not remain proactive, and adopt conservative policies that
passively fight gun possession in order to avoid potential litigation,
the prevalence of illegal handguns will increase and gun violence will
wreak further peril on already weary neighborhoods. 329
Baltimore City's social, economic, and overall wellness depends on
its city council's continued devotion to ensuring that everything is
done to protect its citizens from the perils of gun violence. Although
where the next rash of firearm aggression may take place will always
remain uncertain, the most proven method to deter gun violence's
menacing terror remains reducing the number of both illegal and
legal guns, weakening criminals' access to weapons and diminishing

325. See Falcone, supra note 315, at Al9.
326. Declan McCullagh, Sorry, Mandatory Gun Registration is Constitutional, TAKING
LIBERTIES, Aug. 21,2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504383_162-5258192504383.html?tag=contentMain;contentBody (last visited Apr. 16, 201 0).
327. See supra Part VI.B.
328. See supra Part VI.C.2.a.
329. See supra Part I.
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the related assaults, injuries, and deaths. 330 Baltimore's communities
have gathered in unison to halt the escalation of crime. Now,
lawmakers must take up their part in this critical time of
constitutional change to secure the public's safety and curtail the
deaths of innocent victims. The well being of Baltimore's citizens at
large and the city's youth who may tragically fall victim to gunfire,
like Ronald Jackson, depend on this commitment.
Ian W Henderson

330.

See

OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, PROMISING

STRATEGIES TO REDUCE GUN VIOLENCE

87-94 (1999) (profiling three American cities'
attempts to reduce gun violence by reducing access to guns).

